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Audit quality implications of regulatory change in South Africa
Abstract
Purpose
This paper explores how technical constructions of audit practice are influenced by mandatory audit
firm rotation (MAFR) regulations. The paper responds to calls for additional research on how external
regulation influences audit quality and supplements the predominately quantitative research dealing
specifically with firm rotation and its relevance for audit quality.
Design/methodology/approach
Data are collected from South Africa which is the latest jurisdiction to adopt MAFR (from 2017).
Detailed interviews with 49 participants comprising 24 audit partners and 25 non-auditors are conducted
to explore how MAFR can impact audit quality. For this purpose, audit quality is defined according to
a schematic developed interpretively and based on professional auditing standards and the prior research
on audit quality.
Findings
There is no guarantee that MAFR will bolster auditors’ independence or contribute to a more thorough
audit approach. On the contrary, the effort required by incoming audit firms to gain an understanding
of new clients coupled with material tendering costs is expected to decrease the profitability of audit
engagements with adverse implications for audit quality. A loss of client experience and staff retention
challenges may contribute further to a decline in audit quality. There may be some improvements to
audit practice when an incumbent firm’s work is going to be scrutinised by a new auditor but audit
methodologies, including the nature and extent of testing performed, are not expected to change
significantly because of MAFR. In this way, the regulation may be a symbolic response to a perceived
decline in audit quality and auditor independence rather than part of an effective strategy to encourage
more rigorous audit practice for the benefit of the users of financial statements.
Originality/value
The current paper provides one of the first exploratory accountants of how MAFR is expected to impact
audit practice and, in turn, audit quality. The research responds to the call for more field-work studies
on the mechanics of the audit process by engaging directly with practitioners instead of relying on
inferential testing of broad audit quality surrogates. The study also makes an important empirical
contribution by providing primary evidence on how external regulation influences audit practice from
a seldom studied African perspective.
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1. Introduction and background
In the decade following the global financial crisis of 2008/9, there has been more concern by investors,
the public and regulators about the perceived ineffectiveness of auditors to ‘blow the whistle’ on
corporate misconduct (Hay, 2015; The Economist, 2018a; Wilson, McNellis, & Latham, 2018). In
response, government regulators have turned what was a mostly self-regulated profession into one with
considerable regulatory oversight (Knechel, 2016).
Both audit regulators and the investing public have expressed scepticism concerning the quality of
audits (Chester, 2018; Neate, 2019; The Economist, 2018b, 2019; The New York Times, 2014). The
occurrence of corporate financial scandals has caused regulators to shine a spotlight on the
independence of the auditors from their clients (Hay, 2015; Lennox, 2014). Lately there has been a
trend to question audit firm tenures, as some audit firms have been engaged with clients for many
decades (Horton, Tsipouridou, & Wood, 2018; IRBA, 2016; PCAOB, 2011; Roush, Church, Gregory
Jenkins, McCracken, & Stanley, 2011). Long relationships between audit firms and clients have driven
accusations of auditors being too accommodating of questionable accounting policies and even ‘turning
a blind eye’ to irregularities and misconduct (Favere-Marchesi & Emby, 2018). Regulatory inspections
of audit firms’ work in the United States (US) by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) indicate a failure to exercise the required degree of professional scepticism and to obtain
appropriate audit evidence (Westermann, Cohen, & Trompeter, 2019). Similar unsatisfactory findings
have been reported in South Africa by the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA, 2018).
Regulators are responding with more stringent rules designed to limit auditor tenure and restore both
auditor independence and investor confidence (Knechel, 2016; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Wilson et al.,
2018). Examples include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the US (which introduced stricter
audit partner rotation rules) and more recently, the European Union’s (EU) decision to require
mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) (European Commission, 2014). In June 2017, the IRBA, South
African’s audit regulator, following the EU decision, issued a regulation requiring MAFR for all publicinterest entities, including all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Audit firms
must now rotate off clients every 10 years (IRBA, 2017).
There is little research on MAFR (as opposed to voluntary firm rotation or partner rotation). What has
been done tends to focus on archival studies (such as Corbella, Florio, Gotti, & Mastrolia, 2015; Mali
& Lim, 2018) in the limited number of jurisdictions where the regulation has been implemented (such
as the Republic of Korea or Italy). Experimental studies which construct abstract interventions to
simulate audit firm rotation are also common (such as Daniels & Booker, 2011; Quick & Schmidt,
2018; Wang & Tuttle, 2009). Nevertheless, because there are so few jurisdictions in which MAFR has
been enforced, “there is no clear evidence about whether it is effective” (Hay, 2015, p. 162). At the
same time, the prior research is informed predominantly by positivist research paradigms; few
researchers have used qualitative methods to explore the social, behavioural and decision-influencing
factors which characterise the audit function (Ewelt-Knauer, Gold, & Pott, 2013; Hay, 2015).
Consequently, the MAFR literature does not deal with the technical dimensions of audit practice and
relevance of MAFR for the practitioner community (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013, p. 28). As explained
more generally by Humphrey (2008, p. 193):
“The problem with so much audit research is that it does not explore audit practice per
se, but rather fabricates such practice, studying around the edges of the “black box” of
auditor decision-making or constructing experiments that cannot ever really be
expected to replicate either the real pressures and career challenging or threatening
scenarios that some auditors can encounter in their actual working environment”.
In this context, this paper provides one of the first exploratory accounts of the implications of MAFR
for audit practice, focusing specifically on how MAFR may contribute to higher quality audits or
alternately, fail to do so. Data were collected from South Africa, an ideal environment to conduct a
study of this nature. South Africa has a highly advanced audit industry, capital market and systems of

corporate governance1. Also, South Africa is most recent of a very limited number of jurisdictions to
move beyond partner rotation rules and implement MAFR (Harber & Maroun, 2020; Lennox, 2014).
Researchers are only beginning to investigate MAFR effects in the EU since its implementation in 2016
(see Horton, Livne, & Pettinicchio, 2020).
In 2015, the South African audit regulator (IRBA) began a consultation process after announcing its
intention to follow the direction of the EU with MAFR. A consultation paper was issued in October
2016 requesting formal responses within three months (IRBA, 2016). Parliamentary hearings were then
conducted in February and March 2017 (RSA, 2017a, 2017b), culminating in the announcement in June
2017 of the MAFR ruling (IRBA, 2017).
In this context, studying MAFR in South Africa makes an important contribution to the auditing
literature. Firstly, this study engages directly with practitioners currently grappling with the introduction
of MAFR. In doing so, the current paper responds to calls for additional research on potential
consequences of firm rotation (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Hay, 2015). This call has also come directly
from the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the global umbrella organization representing
the accountancy profession (Choudhury, 2017). The study also addresses the need for more field-work
analysis which moves beyond inferential testing of audit quality surrogates in favour of collecting
primary evidence on how external audit regulations are operationalized in practice (Ewelt-Knauer et
al., 2013; Hay, 2015; Christopher Humphrey, 2008). As explained by Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2013, p. 35),
the views of experienced practitioners are seldom considered in research dealing with the impact of
external regulation on audit quality. What is needed is a more detailed exploratory analysis of how
specific technical constructions of audit practice are influenced by regulatory measures including
MAFR. Secondly, by focusing on South Africa, this paper addresses the need for research dealing with
the functioning of external regulation designed to bolster audit quality in developing economies
(Humphrey, 2008). Thirdly, the current study adds to the limited body of interpretive research which
deals more generally with audit practice. It makes an important empirical contribution by providing
insights on audit quality and MAFR based on expert opinion to complement the predominately archival
research on the topic.
Detailed, semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. Participants were purposefully selected
to include audit practitioners, preparers of financial statements, users of financial statements, regulators
and auditing academics. Two audit quality frameworks are employed, providing the basis for a quality
schematic to explore stakeholders’ perspectives on the possible implications of firm rotation for audit
quality. The first (the professional framework) is based on the International Standard on Quality Control
1, ‘Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Statements, and Other
Assurance and Related Services Engagements’ (ISQC 1) (IFAC, 2009), developed by the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). This framework was selected because it is used
globally as the primary standard for audit firm quality control. The second (the academic framework)
was developed using academic literature on audit quality, in this way avoiding over-reliance on a
professional construction of audit quality which may be inherently biased (Power, 2003).
Together, the two quality frameworks provide a basis for exploring views on the implications of MAFR
for specific aspects of audit practice and the resulting quality of audit engagements. The findings show
that MAFR is likely to impact the audit industry in terms of incentives and profitability. Certain
unintended effects of MAFR are confirmed, such as the threat to audit quality from the replacement of
an experienced audit team with one which is less experienced in the complexities of the client’s
finances. Several other quality effects emerged. For example, auditors will need to devote considerable
resources and time to competing for clients to replace outgoing clients (and fee revenue). This business
incentive may impact their professional obligations to the detriment of quality. The senior staff time
required in risk assessment and planning to bridge the unfamiliarity gap is considerable. Reduced
profitability presents specific risks to audit quality. However, the increased turnover of engagements
1

In 2015 and 2016 the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked South Africa 1st and 3rd out of approximately 140 countries
for “strength of auditing and reporting standards” and “efficacy of corporate boards” (WEF, 2016).

also presents a reputation risk as audit work and financial statements are scrutinized by new audit teams.
This may have a positive effect on audit quality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of MAFR
research, followed by a discussion of the concept of audit quality. The audit quality frameworks used
to construct the interviews and analyse the data are then developed. Thereafter, the interview
methodology is described in Section 3, followed by the results in Section 4, which are thematically
presented. Lastly, Section 5 offers a summary and conclusion to the paper, together with implications
and practical recommendations.
2. Literature review
2.1 Mandatory audit firm rotation
The primary objective of any version of auditor rotation is to preserve auditor independence by limiting
the opportunity for auditors to develop relationships with and dependency on the management teams of
their clients (IESBA, 2018; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). MAFR is the strictest version of auditor rotation
rules, requiring the entire audit firm to rotate periodically. This version is less common but, with the
recent adoption by the EU and South Africa, there is a developing trend in this direction. Currently,
international standards recommend audit partner rotation as sufficient to safeguard auditor
independence (IESBA, 2018, Section 540).
Whether MAFR is effective is contested (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Reid & Carcello, 2017). Most
notably, proponents of MAFR argue that long-standing relationships between audit firms (not simply
individual audit partners) and clients lead to audit failures (Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2014; Tepalagul &
Lin, 2015). Familiarity with the client impairs auditors’ independence and professional scepticism,
resulting in reduced audit quality (Aschauer & Quick, 2018). In contrast, opponents claim that MAFR
improves investor and public perceptions of auditor independence. It does not necessarily improve
independence ‘in fact’ (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Fontaine, Khemakhem, & Herda, 2016). Long audit
firm tenures lead to valuable client- and industry-specific knowledge and expertise with positive
implications for audit quality. As a result, opponents of MAFR believe that it will impair audit quality
because the regulation leads to a loss of experience (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Ewelt-Knauer et al.,
2013; Kwon et al., 2014). New auditors may have ‘fresh eyes’ and may be perceived as more objective
and independent, but they have less knowledge of their clients’ businesses and industries than longserving incumbents. The primary arguments for and against MAFR are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Primary arguments for and against MAFR
There is evidence that longer partner tenures can impair auditor independence and audit quality (Ball,
Tyler & Wells, 2015; Carey & Simnett, 2006). This strengthens the argument for mandating partner
rotation and is consistent with international standards which recommend partner rotation for publicinterest organizations (IESBA, 2018, Section 540). Yet research on the effects of audit firm tenure and
independence or audit quality present mixed results (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Tepalagul & Lin,
2015). For example, Chen, Lin and Lin (2008) and Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) find a positive
association between the length of audit firm-client relationships and financial reporting quality. The
finding is supported by Stefaniak, Robertson and Houston (2009), Tepalagul and Lin (2015), Bamber

and Iyer (2007) and Wang and Tuttle (2009) who argue that long-standing client relationships allow
auditors to understand their clients better and apply more extensive or sophisticated assurance methods.
Similarly, there is no guarantee that long audit firm tenures result in misapplication of accounting and
auditing standards and a reduction in professional judgement and scepticism (Cameran, Prencipe, &
Trombetta, 2016; Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Mali & Lim, 2018). In contrast, some archival studies
conclude in favour of firm rotation (Choi, Choi, Gul, & Lee, 2015; Corbella et al., 2015; Kim & Yi,
2009). Firm tenure may improve audit quality but beyond some point, auditor independence is
compromised and audit quality declines (Brooks, Cheng, & Reichelt, 2013; Davis, Soo, & Trompeter,
2009).
Much of the prior research deals with situations where audit firms are changed for reasons other than a
regulatory requirement (e.g. Blouin, Grein, & Rountree, 2007; Nagy, 2005). This is because of the
scarcity of countries which have mandated firm rotation (Hay, 2015; Lennox, 2014). A review of the
prior archival research highlighted only eight papers testing within jurisdictions which required firm
rotation (i.e., MAFR settings primarily within Italy and the Republic of Korea). These employ audit
quality surrogates, such as discretionary accruals, restatements or auditor report modifications, to
indicate whether, statistically, audit quality changes on rotation. These studies present mixed findings.
To illustrate, using the Italian context where MAFR has been in effect since 1975, Cameran, Francis,
Marra and Pettinicchio (2015) find that quality of audited earnings declined in the first three years
following rotation, suggesting that audit quality improved as audit firm tenure increased and that
unfamiliar auditors are a threat to quality. This does not provide support for MAFR. Yet, Cameran et
al. (2016) show that accounting conservatism, proxied by abnormal working capital accruals, increases
in the last three-year period before firm rotation, implying that the outgoing audit firm anticipates
scrutiny by the incoming auditor. This evidence supports MAFR. Corbella et al. (2015), also using
Italian data with audit quality proxy measures related to earnings management, find that audit quality
did not change upon rotation of Big 4 firms but quality improved for companies audited by non-Big 4
audit firms. This provides partial support for MAFR.
An important limitation of much of this archival research is that findings are based on changes in broad
quality proxies before and after firm rotations. Important audit quality effects related to “auditor
decision-making” and “the real pressures and career challenging or threatening scenarios” faced in
practice by auditors (Humphrey, 2008, p. 193) cannot be understood from such quantitative designs.
This is a contribution this paper intends to make. As explained by Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2013, p. 28):
“The current debate lacks a systematic and critical composition of arguments, practitioner
experiences and opinions and research evidence regarding audit firm rotation effects”.
A market reaction analysis by Reid and Carcello (2017) in the US indicates that investors react
negatively to events which increase the likelihood of rotation. Williams and Wilder (2016) synthesise
the opinions of 15 American audit firms’ comment letters to the PCAOB. These firms expressed broad
opposition to MAFR, preferring to strengthen audit committee governance of the audit function. These
two perception-based studies complement the largely archival research on MAFR but stop short of
explaining how MAFR may change specific aspects of audit practice and the resulting implications for
audit quality. Indeed, to the authors’ knowledge, no papers deal directly with how auditors understand
and respond to MAFR at the firm and individual engagement-level. The views of other key stakeholders
such as analysts, investors and preparers have also not been considered. Hussey and Lan (2001) and
Fontaine et al. (2016) are exceptions. The former conducted surveys of finance directors in the UK,
finding that they were concerned with audit quality and were in favour of rotating audit firms. The latter
interviewed audit committee members in Canada who felt that MAFR was unnecessary and a threat to
their shareholder-granted authority to make audit firm appointment decisions. The views of auditors
themselves and how MAFR impacts audit practice, have not been addressed.
The research presents mixed and inconclusive results. This is also reflected in the contradicting views
on MAFR by regulators, some of whom adopted the rules (e.g., the EU and South Africa) and others,
such as the US, Canada and Australia, who have repeatedly decided against MAFR in favour of more

traditional audit partner rotation rules which they believe offer a superior overall cost-benefit trade-off
(Harber & Maroun, 2020; Horton et al., 2018; Roush et al., 2011). Singapore, having adopted MAFR
over its banking industry, recently decided to repeal the regulation, citing inconclusive research findings
and potential negative consequences relative to partner rotation rules (Choudhury, 2017). As a result,
there is considerable scope for researchers to use qualitative designs to understand the technical and
practical effects of MAFR and supplement quantitative research.
2.2 Conceptual Framework Development
2.2.1 Audit quality
This paper attempts to increase our understanding of the consequences and audit quality effects of
MAFR. It is important to develop a framework for understanding audit quality. The seminal work of
DeAngelo (1981 p. 186) provides a useful but broad definition of audit quality. Here the concept is
defined as the probability that the auditor will (1) uncover a breach of statutory or regulatory
requirements (particularly financial) and (2) report this breach to the appropriate parties. This definition
resonates with the idea that the auditor acts as a type of whistle-blower (Maroun & Atkins, 2014; Wilson
et al., 2018) and that, through a process of verification, the audit contributes to more accurate and
reliable financial reporting (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).
In practice, audit quality is difficult to define and operationalize:
“Despite more than two decades of research, there remains little consensus about how to
define, let alone measure, audit quality… perception of audit quality can depend very much
on whose eyes one looks through. Users, auditors, regulators, and society - all stakeholders
in the financial reporting process - may have very different views as to what constitutes
audit quality, which will influence the type of indicators one might use to assess audit
quality” (Knechel et al., 2013, p. 385)
As stated by the United Kingdom (UK) regulator, “there is no single agreed definition of audit quality
that can be used as a standard against which actual performance can be assessed” (FRC, 2006, p. 16).
Stakeholders view audit quality from differing perspectives, depending on their role and understanding
of the assurance process. Figure 2 summarises the diversity of perspectives on what constitutes audit
quality. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

Figure 2: Varying possible perspectives on what constitutes ‘high audit quality’
Source: Adapted from Francis (2004, 2011) and Knechel et al. (2013)

Users understand audit quality as the absence of material misstatements and confirmation that
management misconduct has been detected and corrected (Knechel et al., 2013). From a broader societal
perspective, audit quality can be inferred based on whether or not an appropriate audit opinion has been
issued, with the result that material economic losses are avoided (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). A more
technical perspective considers audit quality as a function of compliance with standards and regulations
allowing the auditor to collect sufficient and appropriate audit evidence (Francis, 2011; Knechel et al.,
2013). To this end, the guidance provided by the standards issued by the International Auditing and
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) is relevant.
The International Standards on Auditing (ISA) do not define ‘audit quality’ directly. Rather, it is
considered a product of compliance and application of the relevant standards, underpinned by ethical
conduct (especially independence), professional scepticism, professional judgement, appropriate
engagement leadership and a sound system of internal quality control (IAASB, 2009; IFAC, 2009). The
quality control features vary according to the size, complexity and structure of audit firms (ibid) and,
by virtue of their nature, are difficult to observe and measure directly. For example, many aspects of
audit practice comprise proprietary information unavailable to researchers (such as engagement hours
or audit work papers). Consequently, the academic research takes a different approach, focusing mainly
on the outcomes of audit engagements. Commonly used proxies for inferring the level of audit quality
include, for example, the levels of discretionary accruals (Kwon et al., 2014; Mali & Lim, 2018), the
correlation between accruals and future profitability (Francis, 2004) and the cost of financial capital
(Fernando, Abdel-Meguid, Elder, & Lubin, 2010).
2.2.2 Framework derived from professional standards
ISQC 1, read together with other applicable standards such as ISA 200 and ISA 220, outline the essential
‘elements’ or ‘features’ which contribute to ensuring that the auditors’ opinions on clients’ financial
statements are appropriate (IAASB, 2014; IFAC, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b). The standards describe a
process-driven framework which, when implemented appropriately by the auditor and audit firm, results
in high audit quality. The components of this ‘system of quality control’ (IFAC, 2010, p. 38) are
illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: ISQC 1 interrelationships of audit quality components
Source: IAASB (2019, p. 7) and IFAC (2009b)

Taking a risk-based system approach to audit quality, ISQC 1 relies on three ‘key pillars’, namely, (1)
ethical considerations (which include independence), (2) due diligence when accepting or continuing
client relationships and (3) performance considerations (refer Figure 3). Engagement performance
refers to the policies and procedures established during an audit to ensure compliance with professional
standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements. These include supervision and review of
the audit by the audit partner and senior team members (IFAC, 2010). The quality of an audit firm’s
governance structures, including leadership at a client- and firm-level, also play a role. Equally
important is the quality of the knowledge, expertise and capacity of the engagement staff (resources).

The ultimate objective in ISQC 1 is “to establish and maintain a system of quality control” so that
“reasonable assurance” can be provided on a client’s financial statements (IFAC, 2010, p. 39). Overall,
the profession tends to measure audit quality from a perspective of compliance with standards and
regulations and the outcome of the auditor’s report on a client’s financial statements.
2.2.3 Framework derived from the literature
The literature approaches audit quality from a variety of perspectives, not focusing exclusively on the
auditor-centric approach taken by ISQC 1. Acknowledging the varying interpretations, “researchers
identify the fundamental characteristics against which the quality of an audit can be discussed” (Knechel
et al., 2013, p. 386)2. The following primary attributes, derived from the literature reviews of Knechel
et al. (2013, p. 386) and Francis (2011) help to define the elusive concept of ‘audit quality’:






An audit is an economically motivated response to risk, i.e., incentives matter.
The auditor needs to maintain professional scepticism.
The output of an audit is a report but the outcome is uncertain and unobservable.
There is uncertainty surrounding unobservable audit quality outcomes, i.e.,
uncertainty matters.
Each engagement is different. The idiosyncratic nature of an audit arises because
of variations in client characteristics, audit teams, timing of work and assessed
risk and procedures used, i.e., uniqueness matters.
The audit is a logical and systematic activity, responsive to risk, and conducted
by audit practitioners i.e., process matters. Commitment to, and a culture of,
internal quality control matters.
The execution of the audit process depends on leveraging the knowledge and
skills of experts, i.e., professional judgement matters.

The framework presented in Figure 4 integrates the above auditor and engagement attributes (namely,
incentives, scepticism, uncertainty, uniqueness, process, quality control and judgement) with the four
aspects of an audit (namely, input, process, output and context). These four aspects (or divisions) are
commonly employed in audit quality literature to delineate different parts of an audit (Francis, 2011).
This provides a useful schematic for evaluating audit quality.

2

The literature reviews and discussion of audit quality by Francis (2004, 2011) and Knechel et al. (2013) result in a useful
summary and categorisation of audit quality factors, presenting an ‘audit quality framework’ for researchers. The literature
review by Tepalagul and Lin (2015), linking audit quality to auditor independence, is also particularly relevant for the
application of audit quality to the audit firm and partner rotation debate.

Figure 4: Framework for synthesizing and understanding research related to audit quality
Source: Constructed from the literature reviews of Francis (2011) and Knechel et al. (2013)

Many of the characteristics in Figure 4 have been tested for their impact on audit quality. For example,
sound judgement increases quality (Hurtt, Brown-Liburd, Earley, & Krishnamoorthy, 2013; Smith &
Kida, 1991) whereas perverse incentives and pressures lower it (Blay, 2005; Farmer, Rittenberg, &
Trompeter, 1987; Kathryn Kadous & Zhou, 2018). Professional scepticism and knowledge/expertise
concerning the client increase audit quality (Nelson, 2009). A continual challenge, however, is that
many of these cannot be measured due to their subjectivity and qualitative nature. Others cannot be
observed directly as they constitute proprietary information unavailable to researchers (DeFond &
Zhang, 2014; Simnett, Carson Vanstraelen, 2016). This is especially true with the inputs (for example,
incentives which create a conflict of interest or degree of knowledge of the client) and the context
features (for example, audit fees, engagement hours and staff remuneration). Within the audit process,
audit files documenting procedures and judgements are not a matter of public record. The same is true
for the specific findings from regulatory inspections which are usually published in summative form,
omitting client- and auditor-sensitive details3. This makes research on audit quality particularly difficult,
resulting in the majority of audit quality testing focused on publicly available data, mostly from the
financial statements and the auditors’ reports4.
In MAFR research, this challenge is illustrated in the weak audit quality proxies used within archival
studies which attempt to measure audit quality changes surrounding audit firm rotation events. Most
common measure of audit quality in these studies is earnings management and accounting
conservativism, proxied by some form of discretionary accruals (for examples, see Casterella &
Johnston, 2013). These measures are acknowledged to be a poor approximation of the complex and
subjective concept of ‘audit quality’ (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Knechel et al., 2013; Kwon et al.,
2014). As a result, this paper addresses the need for qualitative designs to complement the findings of
archival and experimental research on MAFR (Humphrey, 2008). If regulators intend to improve audit
quality with MAFR rules, we need a deeper understanding on the audit quality effects of the regulation,
beyond its potential to impact these quantifiable quality proxies. The concept of audit quality is difficult,
3

An exception is the inspection reports published by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which go into
some detail on firm-specific findings.
4

Refer to Simnett, Carson and Vanstraelen (2016) as well as DeFond and Zhang (2014) for a review of international archival
auditing research employing quantifiable audit metrics. Casterella and Johnston (2013) review archival research specifically
as it relates to the MAFR debate.

perhaps impossible, to define, let alone measure. Therefore, research on the topic needs to be varied in
approach and design. In so doing, we are responding to calls from both academics (Ewelt-Knauer et al.,
2013; Humphrey, 2008) and professionals (Choudhury, 2017; Fontaine et al., 2016) for further
qualitative research on audit quality effects. This paper employs an interpretive method, utilising the
dual audit quality frameworks derived (Figures 3 and 4) to explore differing practitioner perspectives
on the issues central to the regulation logic.
3. Method
According to Humphrey (2008, p. 177), archival research leaves many important research questions
unanswered. In particular, it does not provide “a serious consideration [of] the potential of adopting
qualitative methodological approaches or ways of viewing auditing and the task/obligations of audit
research that seek to engage much more closely with the social construction of audit practice”. An
exploratory research design relying on detailed interviews can “enhance [the] understanding of the
process of, and structures governing the provision of, auditing services” (Humphrey, 2008, p. 177). For
example, detailed interviews have been used to evaluate how auditors adapt methodologies applied to
financial statement audits to assurance engagements dealing with sustainability and integrated reports
(Dillard, 2011; Warren Maroun, 2018; O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011). The method has been
employed to shed light on how auditors respond to developments in financial reporting (Durocher &
Gendron, 2014) and changes to auditing standards (Khalifa, Sharma, Humphrey, & Robson, 2007).
Detailed interviews have also been used to examine the introduction of regulatory requirements which
expand auditors’ reporting duties (Maroun & Atkins, 2014) or modify the audit profession’s governance
and accountability structures (Khalifa et al., 2007; Loft, Humphrey, & Turley, 2006).
A qualitative research design does not result in reproducible data which can be subject to robustness
checks and probability testing. Nevertheless, detailed interviews are more appropriate for exploring
complex and seldom studied aspects of audit practice where quantitative techniques run the risk of being
reductionist and overlooking important interconnections (Baxter, Boedker, & Chua, 2008; de Villiers,
Dumay, & Maroun, 2019; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). This is especially true when it comes to MAFR which,
to date, has only been examined by a limited number of papers relying on inferential testing of broad
quality surrogates (see Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Hay, 2015).
3.1 Data collection
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews from a purposefully selected sample of audit
practitioners and other experienced role-players. Despite the susceptibility of interview data to
participant bias, especially that of auditors who tend to resist regulatory intervention (Malsch &
Gendron, 2011), this method allows researchers to explore the social, judgemental and decision-relevant
aspects of audit quality. The interview sheet included seven open-ended questions designed to explore
the views of participants on the potential impact of MAFR on audit quality. Open-ended questions allow
participants to express their views and avoid the researcher inadvertently leading the participants. This
approach also allows the researcher to explore participants’ answers in a conversational style,
facilitating in-depth insights into the links to audit quality. The result is more detailed and reliable data
(Dearnley, 2005; DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006).
Purposive sampling was employed to choose participants, based on their expertise within the South
African audit profession and knowledge of issues linked to the MAFR debate. Purposive samples are
most common as a form of non-probabilistic sampling, with sample size guided by the concept of
‘saturation’. Saturation “is normatively taken to imply that data collection should continue until no
additional significant insight is generated and there are no more emergent patterns to be discerned”
(Dai, Free, & Gendron, 2019, p. 3).
The final sample consisted of 49 participants, which is well above the median number of interviews in
accounting research (26) as determined by the literature review of Dai et al. (2019). Refer to Table 1
for a summary of the individuals participating in the current study and to Appendix 1.

Table 1: Overview of participants
Position (abbreviation)

Role description

Audit partner (‘Auditor’)

Audit practitioner; senior leadership within audit firm
Preparer of financial statements; interacts with senior audit
team members; Chief financial officer (CFO) or financial
manager
Senior employee of the IRBA, professional accounting body
or JSE (stock exchange)
Auditing lecturer from a South African university, chosen
based on their knowledge of the academic literature,
regulatory environment, and auditing standards
Senior staff from an investment company, managing thirdparty capital in the equity market

Financial manager
(‘Manager’)
Audit or accounting
regulator (‘Regulator’)
Audit academic
(‘Academic’)
Analysts (‘Analyst’)

No. of
participants
24
6
7
10
2

All participants were familiar with the issues central to the MAFR debate, having followed the events
of the consultation process until the June 2017 ruling. Emphasis in selection was placed on experienced
audit practitioners, each of whom had experience with auditing public-interest companies and with audit
firm and partner rotation5. The participants’ average experience as an audit partner was 16 years and
included representation from the senior leadership of all four ‘Big 4’ firms plus eight of the next largest
audit firm networks in South Africa6. Six of the audit partners acted as managing partners of their
respective national audit firms. The audit partners are considered best placed to provide an insider view
of the direct and indirect consequences of MAFR. All partners selected possessed personal experience
with firm rotations, specifically as the incoming audit firm. The views of the non-auditors (25) were
used to contrast and compare the perspectives of the auditors (24). The seniority and expertise of the
participants, together with their knowledge of the MAFR debate, contribute to the validity and reliability
of the findings (O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011).
The interviews were conducted in person and varied between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. Each
interview was audio-recorded and transcribed. Unique codes were assigned to each transcript to ensure
anonymity. The interviews were conducted in the cities of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and
Pretoria.
3.2 Data analysis
Following a similar approach to Khalifa et al. (2007) and O’Dwyer et al. (2011), the researchers focused
on identifying emerging themes, principles and concepts rather than attempting to measure changes in
audit quality in a positivist sense (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). The transcribed data were analysed
thematically using an iterative process of comparison and contrasting viewpoints. Themes were
identified by allocating open codes to segments of text and then sorting text segments with similar
content into separate categories. The views, arguments and counter-arguments raised by the participants
were structured using the two frameworks in Figures 3 and 4. This approach has been described as a
‘template approach’ as it involves applying a template (categories) based on prior research and
theoretical perspectives (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). The principal codes derived from the
frameworks for audit quality are shown here in Table 27:

5

Judgement surrounding the point of saturation is subjective and much debated in the literature (Dai et al., 2019). The
researchers applied their judgement to when it occurred for the interviews of audit partners only. The views of non-auditors
are included in this study to provide context, contrast, and address bias. Considering how and why views differed among the
groups or types of participants was deferred for future research.
6

The Big 4 firms included PwC Inc.; EY Inc.; KPMG Inc.; and Deloitte Inc. Non-Big 4 firms included RSM Inc.; Nkonki
Inc.; SizweNtsalubaGobodo Inc.; Grant Thornton Inc.; BDO Inc.; Mazars Inc.; Baker Tilly Greenwoods Inc.; and PKF Inc.
7

Note that there is overlap of activities and factors both within each framework and especially when combined. This resulted
in multiple allocation of codes to sections of transcribed interview data.

Table 2: Coding description
Code [identifier]
Code 1 [C1]
Code 2 [C2]
Code 3 [C3]
Code 4 [C4]
Code 5 [C5]
Code 6 [C6]
Code 7 [C7]

Description [link to frameworks]
Ethical factors (technical competence and independence) [Figure 3]
Client engagement or continuance factors [Figure 3]
Engagement performance factors [Figure 3]
Risk management processes [Figure 3]
Leadership and governance factors [Figure 3]
Input, process, output and context factors [Figure 4]
Auditor and engagement attributes (namely, incentives, scepticism, uncertainty,
uniqueness, process, quality control and judgement) [Figure 4]

The code identifiers (e.g., [C1]) are integrated into the results discussion (Section 4) to show the link with
the audit quality attributes derived from the quality frameworks (Figures 3 and 4).
A common argument against qualitative findings is that, since statistical inference is lacking and data
are often collected from direct engagement with a limited number of participants, the results are biased
or anecdotal. Safeguards have been put in place to address these limitations (de Villiers et al., 2019).
Firstly, as discussed in Section 2, findings are generated using audit quality frameworks drawing on the
relevant professional and academic literature. This limits subjectivity and ensures that different
perspectives on the interconnection between MAFR and audit quality are considered. Secondly,
participants have been selected to ensure that they have the necessary experience and expertise to
comment on how firm rotation can impact audit practice. While a degree of bias cannot be precluded,
carefully selecting participants ensures that responses are suitably informed. Thirdly, while several audit
partners have been interviewed, the researchers have also engaged other stakeholders. The objective is
not to compare how views on MAFR vary among the types of participants but to avoid the results being
dominated by the views of a single constituent. Finally, it must be stressed that in qualitative studies,
validity and reliability are a product of generating detailed findings based on participants’ opinions and
cross-referenced to the prior research. This is achieved by reporting anonymised comments and
highlighting how these shed light on the relationship between firm rotation and audit quality using the
frameworks outlined in Section 2. The goal is not to measure quality directly but to engage with experts
to explore potential audit quality effects from MAFR and, in doing so venture inside “the ‘black box’
of auditor decision-making” (Humphrey, 2008, p. 193).
4. Results and discussion
The following discussion of results refers to the codes derived from the audit quality frameworks, as
shown in Table 2 (e.g., [C1]).
The professional obligation of auditors to maintain diligence, technical expertise and independence [C1]
[C7]
throughout the audit (IESBA, 2018; IFAC, 2009) was emphasized by all audit practitioners and 19
of the 25 non-auditor participants. In general, participants felt that recent scandals were exceptional
cases, rather than indicative of wide-spread weaknesses in existing audits8. In this context, only nine of
the 49 participants were in favour of MAFR. This included six regulators (which is to be expected) and
three audit partners (two from the Big 4 and one from a smaller audit firm).
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These include, for instance, scandals at VBS Mutual Bank, Africa Bank and Steinhoff International which involved, inter
alia, alleged contraventions of codes of professional conduct and misapplication of the applicable accounting and auditing
standards. A detailed review of these corporate failures is beyond the scope of this research.

4.1 Engagement team attributes: independence and professional competence
As discussed in Section 2.2 both ISQC 1 [C1] and the academic literature [C7] stress the importance of
ethical standards for high-quality audits, with particular attention paid to auditor independence.
Regulators excepted, none of the participants felt that MAFR would improve ‘independence in fact’
directly. The long-established mandatory partner rotation rule was believed a more cost-effective way
for managing independence threats between senior staff at the audit firm and client. Participants’ views
echo earlier research findings on stakeholder perceptions (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Fontaine et al.,
2016; Reid & Carcello, 2017), as well as archival studies which did not show statistically significant
improvements in audit quality proxies (Cameran et al., 2015, 2016; Kwon et al., 2014). Interviewees’
concerns that MAFR will not have a substantive impact on auditor independence are also in line with
the views expressed on MAFR in the EU (Choudhury, 2017) and the US (PCAOB, 2011) during formal
consultation with industry stakeholders.
Two participants suggested that MAFR can contribute to a reduction in the rendering of non-audit
services which have long been identified as threat to auditor independence (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).
This position was rejected by the remaining interviewees who felt that MAFR is, at best, only an indirect
response to the risks arising from non-audit services. The participants also pointed out that codes of
professional conduct and external regulations (like SOX in the USA and the Auditing Profession Act
in South Africa) already limit non-audit services (see also Hay, 2015; Knechel, 2016).
A key concern raised by several participants, including auditors, is the existing “funding model” [C2] in
terms of which the auditor is remunerated by audit client (P43, Academic). While steps have been taken
to ensure that audit committees, rather than executive managers, set the auditor’s remuneration,
participants felt that there is a still a material threat to auditor independence which is not addressed by
MAFR. Consider, for example, the following comment:
“When the client is such a dominant number in your world; you know, four or five per cent of
your fee income, you can never be truly independent... I’m ultimately coming back to the client
for my fee discussion…whether you rotate or not.” (P22, Auditor)
Participants agreed that MAFR will do little to resolve the tensions between the application of
professional standards and the need to manage client relationships. Instead, the auditor and non-auditor
participants viewed the regulation as being “pushed by the IRBA to influence public perceptions of
auditor independence” (P07, Auditor) irrespective of the practical challenges of implementing firm
rotation and whether it in fact improves independence (P24, Auditor).
The consensus was that public trust in the profession had deteriorated in the wake of the global financial
crisis and local corporate failures. However, all participants, especially auditors, expressed the view
that the general public (and in some cases the ‘investing public’9) misunderstood the audit function and
its inherent limitations. Consistent with long-standing findings on the audit expectation gap (Humphrey,
Moizer, & Turley, 1992; Ruhnke & Schmidt, 2014), the general public was painted as expecting the
auditor to prevent or detect all errors and instances of fraud in a company, yet:
“there is no appreciation for materiality concerns, the intentional nature of hiding fraud and the
fact that the auditor expression of opinion on audited financial information, rather than a
guarantee.” (P12, Auditor)
Participants believe the public expects more of the auditor than can be reasonably delivered. Consistent
with views expressed by audit committee members interviewed in Canada (Fontaine et al., 2016),
auditors are promptly blamed for corporate failures, regardless of the circumstances. The assumption is
that “all problems should have been found by the auditor”10 (P11, Auditor) and that MAFR will, “by
9

This distinction was commonly made by participants who considered investors as a sub-set of the public who have a more
informed and experienced view of the audit function.
10 Audit partners who expressed the strongest resistance to MAFR felt that the IRBA was also inclined to take this view.

some mysterious process, make corporate failures disappear (P24, Auditor). The auditors argued that
MAFR would not remedy limitations inherent to an audit, i.e., it would not result in auditors detecting
every instance of fraud or error.
Similarly, not all financial scandals were believed to be the result of audit failures:
“There is a lack of understanding that these circumstances could arise as a result of factors
outside of the auditor’s control and that the auditor cannot test everything or be reasonably
expected to always detect that which is deliberately hidden from them.” (P14, Auditor)
In these circumstances, MAFR will do little to improve an auditor’s ability to detect material fraud or
error. MAFR is unlikely to reduce the occurrence of corporate failures and bolster long-term confidence
in the profession. This finding is consistent with earlier research which argues that the enactment of
external regulation is often a symbolic response to a loss of public trust in the profession but does not
yield material benefits in terms of improved audit practice and independence in fact (see, for example
Black, 2008; Maroun & Atkins, 2014; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).
Importantly, participants (including the auditors) acknowledged that there are cases where audits are
not completed to the highest standards. In these instances, however, interviewees pointed out that audit
quality is influenced by both the auditor’s capabilities and independence [C1] [C7] (Knechel, 2016;
Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). When the auditor is at fault, no distinction is made between auditor
incompetence (error) and compromised independence in fact. The public (and some claimed, the
regulator) misunderstand MAFR as a tool to address all audit failures. Yet, it is specifically designed to
limit firm tenures and mitigate independence threats arising from these tenures (IESBA, 2018, Section
540). MAFR is not effective for improving the capability or competence of the auditor. As one auditor
put it:
“If you have an incompetent auditor and you rotate [the firm] what have you achieved? You’ve
solved your problem because that firm is no longer your auditor and someone else inherits the
problem. [MAFR] does not fix incompetence, it just moves it around.” (P09, Auditor)
Similarly,
“I’m thinking of last year, we had an error with a listed company. I think it’s an easy scapegoat
to say, ah, you guys have been the auditors for thirty years and that’s why you missed it. I think
they missed the point completely … I think there’s no correlation between an error and how
long you’ve been their auditor.” (P12, Auditor)
The above sentiment was expressed broadly among audit partners, financial managers and analysts.
They confirmed that material fraud and errors are often detected by both newly appointed firms and
long-serving incumbents. This point is arguably anecdotal but it does echo earlier archival studies which
note that longer tenures do not automatically result in poor professional judgement [C7], the
misapplication of professional standards or an increase in the risk of undetected material misstatements
(Cameran et al., 2016; Mali & Lim, 2018; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).
Overall, participants (regulators excepted) expressed doubts about the efficacy of MAFR to improve
independence in fact and promote more rigour in audit testing. There was concern that the public, by
misunderstanding the objective of MAFR, would conclude that audits had become more effective at
whistleblowing against fraud, that audit methodologies had changed or that auditors were somehow
now more capable.
“[MAFR] is not a regulatory tool for bad auditors or incompetence – at best it will only possibly
improve independence.” (P39, Academic, emphasis added)

As a result:
“…there’s a total misunderstanding as to what audit is and what MAFR is designed for - and
we shouldn’t surely change regulations based on perceptions.” (P12, Auditor)
4.2 Professional judgement, experience and expertise
A common theme, emphasized by auditors and academics, was the likelihood of impaired audit quality
because of the relative unfamiliarity of the incoming audit team [C1] [C3]. Participants stressed this would
be especially relevant in the first year of an engagement when the incoming auditor would not have the
deep understanding of the complexities of the client’s business which was possessed by the outgoing
firm.
“…when you start out with a new organisation, particularly these massive, multi-national
organisations, you don’t know what you don’t know. As a result, you don’t know what
questions to ask.” (P12, Auditor)
This finding is consistent with prior research and represents the primary counter-argument to MAFR
(Casterella & Johnston, 2013). As discussed in Section 2, while some studies have examined how audit
quality surrogates change in the years immediately following firm rotation, the results are often mixed
and offer only a high-level account of how audit quality is actually influenced by firm rotation.
As auditor tenure progresses, the auditor develops a better understanding of the business, so that
management becomes “acutely aware” that they “can no longer pull the wool over your eyes” (P17,
Auditor). In this sense, the audit acts as a preventative control against misconduct, becoming more
effective as audit firm tenure increases. Most auditor participants felt that the loss of experience and
expertise resulting from MAFR would be a major threat to audit quality, especially with larger, more
complex and more geographically diverse audit clients.
Knowledge and expertise are pre-requisites for the effective application of professional judgement [C1]
[C3] [C7]
(Knechel, 2016; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). Areas of judgement highlighted by participants
included going concern assessments, evaluation of significant risks, determining key audit matters and
evaluating complex valuations of financial instruments [C3]. According to the participants, these areas
need a thorough knowledge of the business and the industry and, as a result, could be adversely affected
by MAFR and the immediate loss of the experience and expertise of the incumbent engagement team.
The threat to audit quality was viewed as especially high in niche industries, such as banking, insurance
and telecommunications, which required specialized knowledge of operational, regulatory and financial
risks. Commenting on the effect of MAFR in these sectors, one audit partner stated that:
“I am sure an Audit Committee Chair and management will tell you that the most value an
auditor can bring to the auditing process is their deep-seated industry knowledge and expertise
within that particular industry and relating to that organisation. And that institutional
knowledge, if you institute mandatory firm rotation, is completely lost.” (P11, Auditor)
Another, possessing numerous years’ experience at a large telecommunications company, explained
how difficult it was to become familiar with a new client, even when it is in the same industry.
“And having spent probably the better part of 15 years in the telecommunications industry I
pretty much thought I knew the industry well. But I can tell you this new company was very
different… if I haven’t had that experience it would have been much harder.” (P12, Auditor)
However, not all participants agreed with the above comments. A minority view among the auditor
participants was that the auditor should “understand the client before you do all procedures” (P03,
Auditor).

“the work gets done properly or else the [audit] report won’t be signed.” (P06, Auditor)
This view was more common with the academic and regulator participants. Shortcomings in skills and
expertise should be managed before providing the audit opinion, even if this means that additional
resources will be required in the first year of an engagement. Consider the following statements:
“[The incoming] auditor does not have the luxury to take two or three years, or one year even,
to get out of the starting blocks. They’ve got a duty to know the client and know the business,
have the skills and all of those things – even if they make less profit doing so due to overruns.”
(P38, Regulator)
This view emphasises the importance of professionalism and competency [C1] [C7], as well as proper preand post-engagement planning [C4] [C5] [C6]. It was believed that an auditor would not ‘sign off’ on a set
of financial statements in the first few years of an audit without having conducted sufficient audit work,
regardless of the investment required to do so (P06, P38, P44) [C1] [C7]. As a result, especially considering
the potential bias among auditors against MAFR, the claim that a relative lack of experience and
expertise of the client will threaten audit quality may be over-stated. This provides one explanation for
why some studies have found that audit quality remains constant or even increases after firm rotations
(such as Choi et al. (2015), Corbella et al. (2015) and Kim & Yi (2009)).
4.3 Impact on firm infrastructure and human resources
Some research suggests the possibility of MAFR discouraging audit firms from investing in
technologies, systems and processes which can contribute to higher quality audits because the costs of
those investments cannot be recouped over shorter audit tenures (Elitzur & Falk, 1996). This view was
not widely expressed by the participants. Rather, the 10-year audit firm tenure period (as applicable
under the new rules) was considered sufficient to allow firms to recoup set-up costs incurred in the early
years. Auditor participants also expressed the growing use of audit technologies which require audit
firms to update their IT infrastructure, irrespective of the requirement to rotate audit firms. These
technologies, such as data analytics, will drive efficiencies and lower the expected impact of reduced
profitability expected from MAFR [C3] [C4] [C6].
“You do not invest in your own resources on a basis of a client that exists but… on
the basis that you feel that your staff or resources need to be capacitated. This has
nothing to do with a particular client and remember, even [before MAFR], there is
nothing that is stopping a client from walking away…. You could take the money and
invest, and the client can still walk away…. Nobody invests and then goes to a client
and says, ‘you see, this is how much money we have invested so you must stay with
us for the next 100 years’” (P07, Auditor)
While participants felt that MAFR is not expected to undermine investment in technology, it was also
not expected to drive it. The same view was expressed concerning human resources. MAFR would not
likely have a material impact on investment in staff in terms of recruitment and training.
Furthermore, MAFR was not expressed as a factor influencing the change of audit methodologies [C3]
[C6]
. A notable exception was the perceived additional time and resources needed to be spent with client
acceptance processes and work required to understand the client’s business (part of the broader risk
assessment process) [C2]. Otherwise, the audit work logic was determined rather by the international
standards (ISAs) and the client’s risk profile, i.e., internal risk-management policies. Changes were then
applied throughout the firm by way of ongoing internal quality review processes [C4] [C7]. It was not
determined by the regulatory environment. Auditors expressed agreement that existing approaches to
executing risk assessment procedures, testing of controls and substantive testing would not be revised
due to the MAFR ruling [C3] [C6]. These findings are consistent with earlier research showing that external
regulations designed to expand the scope of an auditor’s reporting duties has limited impact on how

audits are executed at individual clients. What is be more relevant is the internal culture of quality
control (see Knechel et al., 2013; Maroun & Atkins, 2014).
4.4 Internal culture of quality control
An audit involves the application of “a rigorous audit process and appropriate quality control
procedures” (IAASB, 2014, p. 12). An internal culture of audit quality, quality reviews and the need for
engagement leader responsibility, has been entrenched at audit firms as part of the requirements of
ISQC 1 (IFAC, 2009; Maroun & Atkins, 2014).
Prior research shows many positive effects of sound internal quality control processes, including higher
audit quality11. Some participants expressed concern that internal quality control processes [C4] [C5] [C7]
may deteriorate because of the strain MAFR will place of firm resources. However, most auditor
participants did not raise this as a concern. The consensus was that audit firms are already held to a high
standard of quality control because of their commitment to professionalism and the effect of other
regulatory measures such as practice inspections (both internal and regulatory). This is confirmed by
both the international and South African-specific literature on the relevance of regulatory inspections
for audit quality (see, for example Logie & Maroun, 2020; Löhlein, 2016; Westermann et al., 2019).
Audit partners also raised the reputational consequences of audit failures [C7] which exist independently
of firm rotation. For example:
“You’re personally invested. It’s my name. I’ve signed. You’re out there in the public... You’re
holding yourself out there. It’s me, it’s not just [firm name], I’m signing there as well.” (P15,
Auditor)
“Based on my experience working here and overseas, between the two Big 4 firms... [in South
Africa], we do take audit quality seriously. Our quality control is higher than what I saw
overseas, and I think there is a good quality element.” (P26, Manager)
Quality control depends on effective engagement performance, active monitoring and review and a
drive for continuous improvement (IAASB, 2014). Echoing the views discussed in Section 4.2 above,
the general position was that these quality control features are “part of the groundwork” or the “DNA
of what [auditors] do”, meaning they should not be impacted by MAFR. The same was true when it
came to engagement leaders taking responsibility for, and actively directing, their audits [C5]. Auditor
participants expressed how engagement partners would need to devote considerably more time to new
clients as part of the client acceptance and planning phases of the engagement. Other stages of the audit
would not likely require more investment of time. Therefore, overall, it appears as though MAFR will
require more senior staff time in these two aspects of the audit (client acceptance and planning
procedures) [C2] [C5], which will again impact the cost of the engagement. Other responsibilities of senior
staff, such as reviewing audit work and monitoring the audit team, being core aspects of a high-quality
audit, would not likely change materially for a new client.
Regulators argued that MAFR would actively promote an internal culture of quality control [C4] [C6]
because of the reputational concerns associated with the outgoing auditor having their work reviewed
by the incoming audit firm [C7].
“So, if I am the outgoing auditor and I know that next year another firm is going to take over, I
don’t want to look bad. So, I think there is a very strong motivation not to slack in quality
control towards the end.” (P38, Regulator)
A senior audit partner, responsible for overall firm leadership, raised a specific concern about audit
quality resulting from the change of priorities imposed on auditors to replace outgoing clients’ fee
revenue. In his view, there was an incentive:
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“…to turn this client, this audit client into an advisory client…To turn this thing around and
make sure our tax and advisory offerings are well entrenched in this client, so that when the
day comes, year ten (or whatever period MAFR requires). We sign off those accounts. We flip
over.” (P15, Auditor)
Partners are under pressure [C7] to retain and grow client revenue [C2] while also performing their role in
safeguarding financial reporting quality [C1]. This conflict has long been acknowledged as a threat to
auditor independence and quality (Lee, 1995; Sikka, 2009; Thornburg & Roberts, 2013). The concern
is that the vested interests of auditors to maintain a profitable [C7] enterprise may result in them “taking
the eyes off the ball” (P08, Auditor). The audit partners, because of their preoccupation with securing
advisory services with the client post rotation, may compromise quality standards. The risk to audit
quality may be especially true for smaller firms which do not have the resources to operate units
dedicated to tendering for new audits. These findings are consistent with earlier research, indicating
that the quality of auditor judgements can be adversely impacted by the perceived risk of losing a client
(Blay, 2005; Farmer et al., 1987) and other client-related and engagement pressures (Kadous, Kennedy,
& Peecher, 2003).
4.5 The audit context: fees, costs and engagement hours
The quantum of audit fee should reflect the amount of work required to perform an audit engagement,
including the degree of seniority of the staff on the engagement team (IESBA, 2018). Audit fees and
billable engagement hours are considered a proxy of audit quality as they provide a measure of
expended effort (Deis & Giroux, 1996; Kwon et al., 2014; Simnett et al., 2016). In addition, ISQC 1
requires the audit firm to have sufficient personnel, with the necessary capabilities, time and resources
to complete the engagements (IFAC, 2009b, p. 44). This requires continual investment in human
resources (IFAC, 2009b, p. 45).
Other than the loss of client-specific knowledge and expertise (as discussed above), most frequently
raised is the cost implication of MAFR for audit firms [C5] [C6]. Participants, particularly auditors, argued
that MAFR would result in “a poorer profession” (P03, Auditor). Firstly, auditors claimed that the costs
involved in producing a competitive tender were “astronomical” (P13, Auditor) and required significant
investment by senior staff in the firm [C7]. Under a system of MAFR, audit firms will need to engage in
more attempts to replace clients and secure appointments. Participants explained that this will lead to a
material increase in tendering costs which will either have to be absorbed by the audit firm or recovered
from existing clients by fee increases.
One mid-tier audit partner was of the view that audit firms would need to develop dedicated departments
to producing tender documents and presentations to audit committees (P24, Auditor). This effort would
probably prove fruitless, auditors explained, considering that multiple firms often competed for the
appointment and non-Big 4 firms were not perceived as acceptable for the larger companies. Auditors
from both the Big 4 and non-Big 4 noted an unwillingness of audit committees and shareholders to
appoint the smaller firms. This view was corroborated by managers, analysts and academics. Although
research does suggest larger firms may produce higher quality audits, they also charge a fee premium
over smaller firms (Carson, Simnett, Soo, & Wright, 2012).
A senior partner from a mid-tier firm explained that non-Big 4 firms may shy away from competing for
larger engagements preferring to target the audits of non-listed entities [C2]. Similarly, a participant who
was currently in the process of producing a tender proposal for a client stated:
“I look at this now relatively small proposal that I had to run with now, the amount of time
spent for the actual proposal... just to go through the processes of getting a document out and
then also to do the presentation. With the amount of time that I personally had to put into that
process, if mandatory audit firm rotation comes in, I want to be out of here” (P14, Auditor).

The audit practitioners are best placed to explain the resources required to produce a competitive tender
bid [C2]. However, one participant (a regulator) did not accept this argument, believing that the industry
would adjust to increased competition.
“I think if it becomes sort of run-of-the-mill to tender, they will cut down on the bells and
whistles… they are going to have to start re-thinking how they tender.” (P36, Regulator)
Nevertheless, auditors believed that significant “overruns and losses”, especially in the first few years
after engagement, were inevitable (P03, Auditor). A related concern is that
“due to total lack of familiarity and knowledge [of the business]… the cost of performing the
audit will have to go up… and the clients will not be prepared to pay for it.” (P22, Auditor)
The auditors agreed that it was uncertain whether the direct and indirect costs of MAFR would be
recouped12. Audit partners felt that audit fees will need to increase post-MAFR to compensate for
additional costs but audit committees will be reluctant to allow this given that the nature of the services
provided to clients will not change (see also Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Managers and analysts confirmed
that tensions between auditors and audit committees on fees are to be expected. The implications for
audit quality are not immediately clear.
On one hand, fee pressure has been linked to lower audit quality as it affects auditor judgement and
diligence (Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011; Houston, 1999). Profitability concerns may impair
audit quality if auditors “cut corners” in work performed (P03, Auditor) or do not sufficiently invest in
staff, in an effort to ensure firm profitability (IFAC, 2009). Interestingly, this was seen as a greater risk
on larger engagements. The more complex the audit, the higher the planned engagement hours to
perform testing and the greater the need for more senior staff with the result that these engagements
may be most susceptible to a net decline in fees. This position is supported by earlier research (in
different settings) which show that fee-related pressures can result in lower levels of testing and an
overall reduction in audit quality (Calderon, Wang, & Klenoptic, 2012; Caramanis & Lennox, 2011;
Harber, Marx, & De Jager, 2020; Johnstone & Bedard, 2001). Consequently, while audit partners took
the position that “if our fees drop, we’ll make a plan…we’ll have to adjust” (P14, Auditor), there is no
guarantee that MAFR will not impact audit quality adversely.
“And then now [regarding] quality control, there is no scope for it in the budget.” (P17, Auditor)
Linked closely to concerns about audit fees and costs was the argument that MAFR would likely disrupt
the market by creating a high turnover of clients and this creates unintended consequences from a
leadership and planning perspective. Audit firms will attempt to replace clients but new clients will not
perfectly match outgoing ones in terms of client fees, timing of audit deadlines or resource requirements.
The auditor participants who held senior leadership positions in their firms explained that firm budgets
and revenues may be adversely affected [C5] [C6]. This can have a negative knock-on effect for retention
and development of staff:
“It is more like an egg and chicken situation - who will hire a hundred people if you do not have
the income to pay them?” (P19, Auditor)
“Capacity is a consequence of access to resources so if you don’t have clients that are
sufficiently large enough to back it up, you are not going to hire people.” (P44, Academic)
Regulators also acknowledged the potentially disruptive effects of MAFR:
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These aspects are largely unresearched with respect to MAFR as the data concerning engagement effort and audit fee
negotiation are proprietary information. Greece presents one of the few jurisdictions in which engagement hours data are
available. Japan, although not mandating disclosure of hours, does require disclosure of audit team members (Simnett et al.,
2016).

“What am I going to with all my people and all these offices that I got? In some places the
whole audit office will have to close!” (P34, Regulator, speaking as though an auditor)
Disruptions to the audit market may also make the industry less attractive with adverse implications for
the human capital necessary for executing high-quality audits [C7]:
“The talented youngsters who are coming through the universities are not staying in the
profession and so there will be a decrease in [audit] quality as the numbers of the grey hairs
start to retire from their positions… Young people don’t want to be here; they don’t want these
IRBA regulations.” (P22, Auditor)
The “risk-reward imbalance” between corporate and public practice careers for professional
accountants meant that the personal costs of remaining in audit may exceed the benefits [C7] (P15,
Auditor). This appeal-impact of MAFR has not yet been explored by researchers although it has the
potential to impact audit quality over the long-term13. For example, job satisfaction and talent retention
among employees has been found in organizational behaviour research to be a driver of organizational
performance (Balouch & Hassan, 2014; Trivellas, Akrivouli, Tsifora, & Tsoutsa, 2015). Applying the
same logic to the audit profession:
“Because [the risk in the profession] has gone up so dramatically and the reward hasn’t gone
up…in the professions used to do well but I think there are problems ahead.” (P22, Auditor)
4.6 Audit outcomes
Despite the considerable disruption of the firm and engagement partner expected by the auditors from
MAFR, none felt that audit outcomes would be affected [C6]. Audit reports will continue to be issued in
compliance with the auditing standards [C1] and, as discussed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, material
changes to engagement processes [C3] are not expected, barring the impact on client acceptance and
planning processes [C2]. This belief that MAFR would not impact the detection, prevention and reporting
of misstatements, error or fraud, and going concern uncertainties at clients is consistent with archival
studies which do not indicate audit quality improvements after firm rotation (for example, Cameran,
Francis, et al., 2015; Cameran et al., 2016; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009).
Interestingly, and consistent with the opinions reported in a Canadian study on MAFR (Fontaine et al.,
2016), some participants felt that periodically forcing firm rotation by regulation called into question
the role of audit committees to discharge their duties [C1]. In South Africa, the responsibility to find a
suitable and independent auditor and maintain the ongoing relationship with that auditor is that of the
audit committee. These responsibilities are established by codes on corporate governance and company
law (IoDSA, 2016; RSA, 2008). The audit committees’ responsibility to apply their mind to auditor
independence was believed to be somewhat diminished as the rotation of audit firms is prescribed by
law. Views expressed by the participants suggest that the regulation could (counter intentionally)
undermine confidence in audits. MAFR is being introduced by the regulator to bolster trust in the audit
profession but, paradoxically, is only required because trust itself is no longer sufficient (Black, 2008;
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The regulator appears to have unwittingly signalled that auditors and
audit committees – fundamental components of the corporate governance machinery – cannot operate
effectively without State intervention when it comes to managing their relationship with each other. If
this is the case, why should non-experts place any confidence in the audit opinion if the same regulator
has not overseen the “rituals of verification” (Power, 1997) on which the opinion itself is based?

13

Audit partner career and quality of life impacts in the US, following the stricter partner rotation rules imposed through SOX,
was explored by Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs (2012).

5. Summary and conclusion
This paper adds to the limited body of research on MAFR which, to date, has relied predominantly on
archival tests to conclude on the impact of firm regulation on quality surrogates. By engaging with
practitioners who are currently grappling with how to respond to the promulgation of MAFR, the current
study makes an important contribution to theory and practice by offering empirical evidence on possible
implications in practice of this increasingly common audit regulation. In doing so, the study responds
directly to the calls by Humphrey (2008), Khalifa et al. (2007) and Power (2003) for additional fieldwork research into the operation of the audit process, as well as by Choudhury (2017), Ewelt-Knauer
et al. (2013) and Hay (2015) for research on the link between MAFR and audit quality at the firm- and
engagement-level. The paper also addresses the need to conduct research in an emerging economy
context to understand the functioning of regulation designed to bolster audit quality.
The results indicate considerable resistance to MAFR and its ostensible outcome of improving audit
quality. The risk to audit quality following firm rotations because of the relative unfamiliarity of the
client’s business by the new audit firm, remains the primary argument against the regulation. The more
established partner rotation rules, supplemented by audit committee oversight, as currently endorsed by
international standards (IESBA, 2018), is viewed by auditors as a more cost-effective means of
preserving auditor independence. There was consensus among participants that auditors in South Africa
were already acting with the requisite diligence, technical expertise and independence required by the
professional standards. Specific examples to the contrary from recent corporate failures14 were felt to
be exceptions rather than indicative of a general decline in audit quality, often the result of auditor error
rather than a lack of independence.
The IRBA was criticised for conflating independence in appearance with independence in fact. Both
auditors and non-auditors have also questioned whether MAFR will result in material changes to the
systems, processes and methodologies which are essential for ensuring high-quality audits. In this way,
the enactment of MAFR in South Africa may be more a symbolic response to a perceived decline in
audit quality than a well-planned strategy for driving more rigorous audit practice. The public is
believed to misunderstand the role of the auditor and the purpose of MAFR. If non-experts assume that
MAFR automatically results in more thorough audits being executed by independent practitioners the
regulation may, paradoxically, undermine confidence in South African assurance. This is especially
true when considering that, because MAFR does not lead to substantive changes to audit practice, it is
unlikely to prevent audit failures or reveal previously undetected instances of fraud and error.
The implications of MAFR for the audit profession must also be considered. Even if some benefits from
improved independence and audit quality are realised, it is unclear whether these will exceed the costs
of the regulation. The primary cost impact is likely to be in the client acceptance, tendering and
marketing processes required to secure new clients, as well as in the efforts (mostly by senior audit
staff) to understand the new client in the early years of appointment. Auditors will also need to invest
considerable time and financial resources in gaining an understanding of new clients and training their
engagement teams, particularly in cases in which a client is based in a new industry or sub-sector. The
costs are expected to be material and are unlikely to be recovered from clients because MAFR does not
change the nature and scope of the services which auditors are providing.
Internal quality control practices were not believed to be at risk under the regulation. On the contrary,
as the outgoing firm’s work is available for scrutiny by the new auditor, they may even improve. The
inspection of the audit work (by the incoming audit firm) and the potential for prior year restatements
may provide a reputational incentive to improve internal firm controls. Examples include ethics checks,
audit work documentation procedures and internal engagement quality control reviews.
The current paper’s findings yield several implications and practical recommendations. Firstly, the
regulator needs to be aware of the likelihood that MAFR will reduce profitability. In addition, senior
14

Refer to footnote 7.

audit staff identified the adverse incentive created whereby fee replacement strategies may distract the
audit partners as the rotation event approaches. This may compromise the diligence applied to the
engagement. In audit fee negotiation, audit committees need to be aware of these cost pressures and
consider allowing higher audit fees to compensate. If fees do not increase, lower profitability is likely
to impact audit quality negatively as it places a constraint on the allocation of staff resources to the
engagement. Over the longer term, lower profitability may also present a problem in the industry with
talent retention.
Secondly, auditors are concerned that MAFR will cause periods of over- and under-capacity which are
difficult to budget. There is a danger that the initial disruptions caused by firm will impact staff morale,
skill development and career progression adversely. The audit profession may become less appealing
to university graduates with long-term implications for audit quality. Both audit firms and the regulator
need to review how MAFR impacts client-auditor dynamics, the demand for trainee accountants and
the progression of longer-serving individuals.
Thirdly, the burdensome and costly tender proposal process can be mitigated through guidelines issued
jointly by the regulator and profession. This would standardise and streamline the competing for
appointment, as well as promote more thorough communication between the incoming and outgoing
audit firms. Facilitating a more effective knowledge transfer will reduce the inexperience threat to audit
quality. The two audit firms may, for example, formalise agreements to share information on key audit
matters and significant risks. Where practical, the incoming audit partner can ‘shadow’ the outgoing
audit partner, similar to the approach followed when dealing with partner rotations on a client within
an audit firm. This will require support from both audit firms and the client with careful planning to
avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary costs. Guidelines for compensating auditors for the investments
made to understand a new client’s business in the first few years of appointment may also be helpful.
Finally, the participants expressed concern that the regulator has moved too quickly with the
introduction of MAFR. The regulation has been enacted and the first rotations must be completed before
April 2023, i.e., between June 2017 (date of the ruling) and April 2023. Careful post-implementation
review will be required to evaluate the impact of these firm rotations on audit firms, the clients, and the
users of financial statements. The costs of MAFR may indeed be lower than the findings of this study
suggest, even more so if these findings and recommendations are considered by the regulator and result
in mitigating responses to unintended consequences.
As in any study of this type there are inherent limitations and additional research will be required. The
research is based on a single jurisdiction which has recently implemented MAFR. Future research can
target other jurisdictions and a broader set of stakeholders with interpretive qualitative designs. A
weakness of the current paper is that it is based on data collected from participants who had either not
yet experienced a firm rotation or were in the process of rotating for the first time under the MAFR rule.
As a result, it is possible that the advantages and disadvantages of rotation are not fully understood and
have, therefore, been over- or under-estimated. A longitudinal study is required to evaluate how
experiences with MAFR and its implications for audit quality change over time. This should be done
using a similar exploratory approach to that followed in this paper to avoid over-simplifying the
interconnections between external regulation and audit quality. Complementary quantitative analysis,
either to confirm or refute qualitative findings, will also be useful.
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APPENDIX 1: Description of participants
Participant identifier
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
P11
P12
P13
P14
P15
P16
P17
P18
P19
P20
P21
P22
P23
P24
P25
P26
P27
P28
P29
P30
P31
P32
P33
P34
P35
P36
P37
P38
P39
P40

Participant description
Auditors
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Big 4 firm
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Non-Big 4 firm (mid-tier)
Managers
Non-executive director and audit committee member
Senior financial manager and professional accountant
Senior financial manager and professional accountant
Chief financial officer and professional accountant
Senior financial manager and professional accountant
Senior financial manager and professional accountant
Regulators
Senior staff member at the IRBA
Member of stock exchange (JSE) regulatory body
Senior role in professional accounting institute
Member of accounting standards regulatory body
Senior staff member at the IRBA
Member of accounting standards regulatory body
Member of corporate governance regulatory body
Academics and Analysts
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)

P41
P42
P43
P44
P45
P46
P47
P48
P49

Auditing academic (South African university)
Senior analyst (third-party asset management company)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Auditing academic (South African university)
Senior analyst (third-party asset management company)

APPENDIX 2: Interview sheet
1. Please describe what you understand as the purpose of the IRBA in pursuing MAFR
regulation in South Africa.
2. In comparison to the current system of mandatory partner rotation, do you believe
MAFR will achieve its primary objective of preserving or improving audit quality?
Please explain.
3. Comment on the impact of MAFR on the public’s perception of the audit industry.
4. Will MAFR affect the performance of audit engagements in any way? (resources, staff,
the extent of monitoring, supervision and review, for example).
5. Please comment on your view concerning the primary argument against MAFR
(namely, that the incoming audit firm is comparatively less familiar with the client’s
business).
6. What changes, if any, do you foresee the audit firms implementing in response to
MAFR?
7. What further or final implications do you perceive MAFR will have on audit quality in
South Africa?

